it were present, one would expect suicide levels to be highest in nuclear centers of the nations (e.g., Paris for France), and then decrease as one moved away from these centers. Durkheim found no such patterning, and concluded that suicide did not involve a moral contagion. Pope (1976:181-84) reexamined Durkheim's analysis, and concluded that he had not adequately tested the imitation hypothesis, since it is not geographical patterning, but whether the suicide of one person triggers other suicides that determines if the process is operative. Employing a quasi-experimental method to examine the influence of suicide stories that appeared on the front page of the New York Times between 1947 and 1968 on the subsequent-month suicide patterns, Phillips (1974) formulated a new test of the imitation theory. Contrary to Durkheim, he found a significant rise in the number of suicides in the month after these stories appeared in the New York Times. Phillips (1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1983 ) has extended his examination of imitation to include homicides, motor vehicle fatalities and airplane accidents. This paper reexamines Phillips's findings for imitative suicide (the Werther effect), extending the time period from 1968 to 1977. It is shown that Phillips did not adequately specify what type of individual suicides are likely to be imitated. Only the suicides of national celeb-rities who provide potential role models for individuals contemplating suicide cause an increase in national suicides. Furthermore, the quasi-experimental methodology comparing the number of suicides in the month after a publicized suicide with the expected number of suicides in that month, determined by averaging suicides in the previous and subsequent year, has two serious weaknesses: (1) it is not a very powerful technique, since it only compares experimental periods with control periods, thereby not utilizing all available information; (2) it does not allow controls for other factors which may simultaneously influence the suicide rate (e.g., the national suicide rate in any particular year is linked with the state of the economy, and a downturn in the economy may significantly influence the expected number of suicides in the month after a publicized story in the New York Times).
IMITATION AND SUICIDE
In the context of the study of aggregate suicide, imitation and suggestibility have traditionally been restricted to social actors separated over space and time. It is necessary to distinguish various types of individual suicide' that might be imitated. One type of suicide relates to some symbolic or group activity which creates group pressure(s) that cause an individual to kill oneself (a form of altruistic suicide; see Durkheim However, this imitation is only likely to occur among a small subgroup of the population. A third category that might trigger imitative suicide is the suicide of national celebrities, i.e., individuals who are well known and recognized by name and pictorial image by the larger American public. These individuals have usually achieved prominence in an occupation subject to significant public exposure, but some social actors may become celebrities through their social connections with other prominent celebrities (e.g., Jackie Kennedy). The defining characteristic of celebrities is that they are known for being known. Boorstin (1962) sees the development of this human type in modem American society as resulting from the growth of the modem mass media (e.g., the national press, magazines, radio and television), and their projection of a multitude of verbal and pictorial images to the American public.
This study hypothesizes that not all stories about prominent suicides on the front page of the New York Times lead to a subsequent increase in suicides, but only stories about the suicides of national celebrities. that the number of monthly suicides at any time is linked with the state of the national economy, and in the period 1969 to 1977, unlike the earlier 1947 to 1968 period, the national economy was subject to more frequent economic shocks (e.g., the oil embargo of 1973). A number of studies (Pierce, 1967; Brenner, 1976; Vigderhaus, 1977) have shown that the national suicide rate increases with increased unemployment. To illustrate how this economic effect might influence the results in Table 1 , consider the particular case of Freddie Prinze. One month after he committed suicide there was a rise in suicides (179.5). However, computations using the quasi-experimental method show that in every month in 1977 there was a rise in expected suicides because of the large decrease in unemployment in 1978 after the previous recession. The quasiexperimental method cannot control for temporal shifts in the level of unemployment. Rather, a multivariate time-series model is required to accomplish this task.
METHODOLOGY
In employing the quasi-experimental method, Phillips examined relative changes in suicide counts between adjacent years. In a more recent study of imitative suicide linked with television news stories, Bollen and Phillips (1982) used daily suicide counts. By contrast, the multivariate time-series technique employed in this study uses months, rather than days or years, as the unit of analysis. A number of studies (Tiao and Wei, 1976; Wei, 1978; Abraham, 1982) show that utilizing larger aggregate units significantly influences the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables. For example, a study of economic business cycles (Bums and Mitchell, 1946:203-69) showed that the use of yearly rather than monthly data made it impossible to examine cyclical effects. While even smaller time units (e.g., days) yield more accurate results in relation to the cyclical effects, they are subject to high measurement errors. For all trauma (physical injury) deaths, which include suicide, it has been shown (Trunkey, 1983 ) that these types of death have a trimodal peak, with 50 percent of them occurring instantly, 30 percent within hours of the event, and 20 percent occurring days, weeks or months after the event. By employing monthly rather than yearly data one can better determine the cyclical effects, while by employing monthly rather than daily data one minimizes daily measurement errors.
The two previously cited studies employ frequency counts that either compare relative shifts in suicide (the quasi-experimental method) or examine changes in suicide in a short time period (1972 to 1976 Since other studies (e.g., Adams, 1981) demonstrate that average duration of unemployment influences the suicide rate, the omission of this variable from equation (1) causes a specification bias in the findings. Including the variable, and employing the Almon technique, a four-month lag with a first-order polynomial is found to be appropriate for employing the model in equation (1). Table 3 indicates the values of the slope coefficients, the t-values and the weights for the four time periods. The inclusion of average duration of unemployment in the model does not lead to a linkage of front-page stories on suicide and the monthly suicide rate. For the distributed lag it is found that 72 percent of the effect of economic change is felt one month after the shift, a result consistent with Vigderhaus's (1977:42), using the Box-Jenkins technique, that unemployment has an instantaneous impact on suicide.
While front-page stories on suicide have no impact on subsequent suicides, it is possible that celebrity suicides do have an impact. To test this hypothesis, CELB is substituted for FRNT in equation (1). Initially not including AVER into the model, a significant linkage is found between celebrity suicides in the New York Times and subsequent suicides. Introducing AVER into the model, Table 4 indicates the values of the slope coefficients, the t-values and the weights, where the model uses a firstorder polynomial and a four-month lag for the Almon technique. Publicized celebrity suicides significantly increase subsequent suicides. One can determine the increased number of suicides that result from publicized celebrity suicide in the New York Times; CELB = Month after a front-page story on the suicide of a celebrity in the New York Times; AVERi = Average duration of unemployment (i = the time period of the average duration of unemployment, where i goes from 0 to n). The war variable, the months, the front-page variable and the celebrity variable are all dummy variables. Table 4 is that some social event (e.g., political crisis) that influences both groups causes both the suicides of celebrities and other individuals. To test this hypothesis, the suicide rate in the model was lagged by one month. If this alternative hypothesis is correct, the lagged suicide rate should be positively related to CELB. A negative relationship was obtained, thereby disproving this alternative interpretation of the findings.
DISCUSSION
Using multivariate time-series analysis rather than the quasi-experimental technique, this paper reexamined Phillips's (1974) data, controlling for economic shifts, seasonal effects and war, and found no significant linkage between suicide stories on the front page of the New York Times and subsequent suicides. By contrast, for celebrity suicides there was a significant relationship between this type of suicide and subsequent suicides.
One possible explanation for the previous finding is that celebrity suicides are more likely to generate mass-media publicity than all the other front-page suicides in the New York Times between 1947 and 1977. Many of the suicides listed in Table 1 were individuals from the New York City area, or were known to only a small subgroup of the American population. The New York Times is a national and international newspaper with a significant readership among middle-and upper-class elites, and front-page suicides in the paper may not be typical of suicides publicized by the national mass media. By contrast, the suicide of a celebrity that appears on the front page of the paper is likely to be highly publicized nationally. This explanation assumes that celebrity suicides lead to increased monthly suicides not because of the unique quality of the celebrities, but because their suicides are highly publicized. Support for this explanation is shown by the effect of various categories of celebrity suicides on subsequent suicides. The six celebrity suicides can be differentiated as the suicides of (1) entertainment celebrities (Landis, Monroe, Prinze), (2) national political celebrities (Forrestal and Hunt), and (3) an international celebrity (Vargas). One would expect that the most publicized suicides would be those of entertainment celebrities, then national political celebrities, and finally the international celebrity. If this explanation of the finding is correct, then the subsequent change in suicides should be related to the assumed national publicity generated by the suicides. An examination of Table 19 indicates that there was a mean rise of 133.8 suicides after the suicides of entertainment celebrities, a rise of 98.0 for national political celebrities, and a rise of 35.8 after the suicide of the international celebrity. These findings indirectly support the publicity interpretation.
A second possible explanation of the findings is that celebrities possess certain social characteristics that cause individuals to identify with them, and their suicides increase the probability that these individuals commit suicide. This explanation assumes that it is the publicly defined characteristics of celebrities that cause an increase in monthly suicides, rather than the high national publicity of their suicides. Bollen and Phillips's (1982) analysis on the impact of individual publicized television suicide stories between 1972 and 1976 on subsequent suicide patterns lends support to this hypothesis. Their study examines seven individual sucides, and finds that the suicide of the one celebrity in the group (George Sanders, the actor) causes the largest increase in subsequent suicides. Since all seven suicides were heavily publicized by the television media, the findings suggest that public identification with celebrities is a factor in explaining suicide increases.
The available empirical evidence offers support for both hypotheses. Because this study and Bollen and Phillips's (1982) study employs aggregate data, it is difficult to test the two interpretations adequately. In analyzing aggregate data there is always the danger of an "ecological fallacy" (Robinson, 1950) , which involves making individual-level inferences from aggregate findings. Some aggregate data (e.g., voting data) allow individual inferences, but the rareness of suicide makes such individual-level inferences impossible (Selvin, 1965) . One means of testing the two hypotheses, both of which may be partially valid, would be to examine the suicide patterns of subgroups of the population (e.g., racial groups, class groups) over time. United States daily mortality statistics, currently available between 1972 and 1977, provide a data source for examining the suicide behavior of subgroups of the population. If the characteristics 9 The suicide changes measured in Table 1 are different from the results obtained from the regression model, and should be seen as a first-order approximation of the more sophisticated analysis. of celebrities influence suicide patterns, one would expect greater increases in suicide among the subgroups that identify with them. For example, if survey studies showed that women were more likely to identify with Marilyn Monroe than men, and the hypothesis that individual identification with celebrities influences subsequent suicide patterns is assumed to be true, then one would predict that only female suicides would rise significantly after her suicide. A second possible means of testing the two interpretations might involve case studies of individual suicides after celebrity suicides. Future studies of the findings of this paper. will have to employ a variety of methodological techniques with disaggregated data to interpret the meaning of the results.
